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1 Introduction
In most monetary models in the general equilibrium tradition, monetary policy (or more specifically,
the money growth rate) is either exogenously given, picked by an independent central bank/ revenue-
seeking government, or determined by a benevolent social planner. While such constructs have their
uses, they represent clear departures from reality. After all, the inflation rate of no country is ever
determined by a mythical social planner, or by the monetary authority in a vacuum. Economic agents
clearly exhibit an entire spectrum of tastes for inflation and the political consensus from the diﬀerent
segments of society (reflecting their various likes and dislikes) most certainly weighs heavily in the
decision making of the central banks.1 In fact, the latter routinely face overt political pressure to
adhere to clearly stated mandates on the inflation rate.2 Even the most independent central banks,
as US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has said, are not in any position to “shut down the
political pressure valve”.3’4 This paper presents one possible analysis of how political factors may come
into play in the equilibrium determination of inflation in a democracy.
There are three “stylized facts” that such an analysis ought to contend with. First, the fraction of
household wealth held in liquid assets (checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts,
call accounts, cds, and directly held mutual funds) decreases with income and wealth, as documented
for the United States in Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000). The implication is that the
rich hold a large fraction of their wealth in the form of interest-bearing assets and not in the form
of barren money. Second, even in the most financially developed countries, a small fraction of the
1Easterly and Fischer (2001) using polling data for 31869 households in 38 countries, find evidence that suggests that
the poor view inflation more as a problem than the rich.
2Bob Woodward, Assistant Managing Editor, The Washington Post in an interview, January 18, 2001 put it nicely:
“Obviously the job of the Federal Reserve is to keep inflation under control: It’s kind of rule one, and there’s good reason.
If you go back to what happened in the ’70s when inflation got out of control, it really hurt the economy, drove millions
of people out of work, [and] was a giant setback for everyone who lived in the country at the time when you really look at
it historically, so that’s his [Greenspan’s] job: To fight inflation.”
3 From ABC News: [http://204.202.137.112/sections/politics/DailyNews/greenspanbush 0001217.html]: U.S Vice
President on Fed Chairman Greenspan “We want to work very closely [with Greenspan]. He is the independent chairman
of the Federal Reserve. They are responsible for monetary policy, but there is a degree of cooperation required between
any administration in terms of monetary policy and fiscal policy ... It would be foolish not to work closely together.”
4“What I am striving for is the concept of policy consistency over time: a countercyclical response which is consistent
with, or can be reconciled with, the FOMC’s long-run goal and which, furthermore, is seen as consistent by the pub-
lic.”(emphasis ours) [Gary Stern, President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Formulating a Consistent Approach to
Monetary Policy, 1996]
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population hold interest-bearing assets; in the US, 59% of households do not hold any interest-bearing
assets [Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000)].5 They also point out that the relevant decision for the
majority of US households is “not the fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form, but whether
to hold any amount of [such] assets at all.” Moreover, this “decision to adopt the financial technology”
depends largely on the opportunity cost in terms of interest-income foregone and other physical costs.
This suggests that even when interest-bearing assets are available, not everyone may be able to aﬀord
them. The third and final fact is this: every country in the world relies to some extent on seigniorage
as a source of revenue.6
We produce a pure-exchange overlapping-generations model with two-period lived agents that builds
upon these aforementioned ideas. The model exhibits income heterogeneity among the young; the old,
however, have no endowment. There are two saving instruments, fiat money (the “bad” asset) and an
inflation-shielded asset (the “good” high-real-return asset). Following Bryant and Wallace (1984) and
more recently, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), we assume that the good asset can be accessed only
upon payment of a fixed upfront cost. Agents choose whether to pay this cost and hold the better asset
or not pay it and simply hold money.
Following Dolmas, Huﬀman and Wynne (2000), we introduce a democratically-elected government
as the entity that must raise revenue to finance a fixed exogenous level of spending (that benefits no one).
In our setup, there are two instruments for revenue generation: a lump-sum tax paid by the young, and
an inflation tax.Young agents in the economy vote on the fraction of the government’s spending that
will be paid for by the inflation tax. As will be clear below, the aforementioned fixed cost introduces a
non-convexity in their preferences over this fraction thereby destroying the single-peakedness of indirect
5Keister (2000) using Surveys of Consumer Finances data, documents that after housing, “the second most popular
form of saving for a vast majority of Americans was cash accounts; families in the bottom 80% of the distribution kept 11
percent of their assets in checking, and savings accounts, and other highly liquid financial instruments.” Kenickell et. al
(2000) report that 13.2% of US families in 1998 (down from 18.7% in 1989) did not hold even a checking account, and that
82.6% of them had annual incomes less than $25,000. Interestingly, when asked why they did not have a checking account,
12.9% of the respondents cited “not enough money” and 11% cited “service charges too high” as their “most important”
reason.
6Click (1998) documents that between 1971-90, in a wide cross-section of countries, currency seignorage as percent of
GDP ranged from 0.3% to 14% and seignorage as percent of government spending ranged from 1% to 148%. By various
measures, the United States has raised about 0.3% of real GDP via seigniorage in the post-war period, although the use of
inflation as a means of funding war expenditures was not uncommon in the 19th century. See also Cukierman, Edwards,
and Tabellini (1992).
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utilities. Suppose the precise policy-package combination (of the inflation and the lump sum tax) is
chosen by the Condorcet criterion, i.e., the winner defeats all others in pairwise majority-rule elections.
Restricting attention to stationary states, we ask: Would the electorate prefer that the inflation tax
partly or fully pay for the spending?
We specify a lognormal distribution for young-age endowments and apply numerical methods to
examine the properties of our model economy. We find a positive support for inflation. Somewhat
surprisingly, the model produces a interesting and novel non-monotonic theoretical relationship between
the winning policy-combination and the extent of income inequality. In other words, at suﬃciently low
levels of inequality, the winning policy-package combination involves high reliance on direct taxes and
less on inflation. As the level of inequality increases, the reliance on inflation starts to increase. As
inequality crosses a certain threshold, however, the elected reliance on inflation starts to fall. The
intuition for this result plays oﬀ two eﬀects, a “tax rate” and a “tax base” eﬀect. Agents who hold
only storage escape the inflation tax and therefore vote for 100% use of the inflation tax. As income
inequality rises, the number of storage holders rise, and this shrinks the size of the inflation tax base.
The money-holders then pit the prospect of a relatively high inflation tax (which is regressive, since it
is not paid by the rich storage holders) versus the regressive lump-sum tax (which is paid by all). The
non-monotonic nature of the predicted relationship is also broadly supported by cross-country evidence.
What is novel here is that the inflation rate, the real money demand, and the distribution of money
and storage holders, are all jointly endogenous. In general, changes in the inflation rate, therefore, bring
about changes in the size of money demand via the actual amount of money desired by each money
holder and also via changes in the composition of society among storage and money holders. It is this
last “composition” eﬀect that serves to increase the regressivity of the inflation tax beyond the standard
eﬀect that works oﬀ the fact that poorer people hold a larger fraction of their wealth in liquid form than
richer agents. That is, as inequality continues to climb, the fact that there are more storage holders
all of whom can entirely avoid the inflation tax, makes the latter even more regressive than the lump
sum tax. It is this last eﬀect that is responsible for why the elected reliance on inflation falls beyond a
certain threshold of inequality.
Our paper is part of a line of research that tries to address monetary issues in models with het-
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erogenous agents using insights from political economy models.7 To date, this literature has focussed
on two issues: a) accounting for a positive relationship between income inequality and inflation, and b)
identifying an inflation bias on the part of the median voter. The papers that are closest in spirit to our
current endeavor are those by Dolmas, Huﬀman, and Wynne (2000), Bullard and Waller (2001), and
Albanesi (2003). We extend Dolmas, et al. in two crucial ways: (i) we allow agents to avoid the inflation
tax by permitting them access to a costly storage technology, and (ii) in addition to seigniorage, the
government can implement an alternative regressive tax.
Albanesi (2003) oﬀers a model that can account for both the positive correlation between income
inequality and inflation and the redistributional eﬀects of the inflation tax. In her model, infinitely lived
agents are permanently diﬀerentiated by human capital endowments. Two transaction technologies are
available: cash and an alternative means of payment that allows agents to avoid the inflation tax.
As the inflation tax increases, highly productive agents will use the alternative payment technology
to purchase a larger fraction of the consumption goods. Albanesi uses Nash bargaining to choose the
division between labor taxes and inflation taxes. Like our model, her setup can account for cases in
which the poor are more vulnerable to inflation than the rich. Since the poor tend to lose more if there
is inflation, they are the weaker party in the political process that determines the course of fiscal and
monetary policy.
Erosa and Ventura (2002) calibrate a model that is well-equipped to handle the distributional eﬀects
of inflation to US data. Like us, they allow the rich to avoid the inflation tax. A principal finding of their
paper is that “the burden of inflation is substantially higher for individuals at the bottom of the income
distribution than for those at the top.” However, they do not study the concomitant political economy
issues that naturally arise as a by-product of their finding. Bullard and Waller (2004) focus their
attention on precisely the political economy issues. In particular, they consider the more general issue
of “central bank design”. In a model with multiple assets (including bonds and capital) but no within-
generation heterogeneity, they consider the welfare (and dynamic) implications of conducting monetary
7An early important work in this area is Loewy (1988). There is a broader literature that considers, among others,
issues like: a) whether monetary policy is influenced indirectly by who gets appointed by the President to the Board of
Governors in the United States, b) whether political parties have an incentive to initiate “monetary surprises” that increase
consumption and GDP temporarily right before an election, c) whether the median voter likes inflation because inflation
erodes the cost of servicing a high debt.
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policy via either majority voting, or a policy board, or a constitutional rule (inspired by Azariadis and
Galasso, 1996). In their setup, the real action lies in the tension between the young and the old over
the desired inflation rate, and the old may veto the young. They find the presence of a inflation bias in
monetary policy both in stationary and nonstationary settings under the majority-voting design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment and Section
3 presents the voting equilibria and their properties. Section 4 describes our main empirical findings
and discusses the fitted econometric relationship between reliance on seigniorage and income inequality.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a simple pure-exchange overlapping generations model where at any discrete date t = 1, 2, 3...,
a new generation of unit measure is born, and lives two periods. There is intragenerational income
heterogeneity among young agents. Each young agent draws his first period endowment, y, of the single
consumption good from a density function, f(.) with support [ymin,∞). Agents have no endowment
of the good when old. The preferences of each young agent over consumption in the two periods of
life are described by an atemporal additively-separable utility function, U(c1, c2) where c1 stands for
consumption in the first period and c2 stands for consumption in the second period. For analytical
tractability, we will assume a specific functional form for U namely:8
U(c1, c2) = ln c1 + ln c2. (1)
Because agents like old age consumption but have no old age income, they have to save. There
exists two saving instruments. First, there is a sure-return linear storage technology. One unit of the
consumption good invested in this technology earns a sure gross real return of x > 1 next period. Notice
that the real return to storage is perfectly invariant to inflation, and hence, the voting outcome. Second,
there is fiat money and Rm is its stationary return. Money is the “bad” asset; it is dominated in rate
of return by storage, i.e., x > Rm. The good storage technology is accessible only upon payment of a
8The additive log formulation and much of the general environment draws heavily from Dolmas, Huﬀman, and Wynne
(2000).
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fixed cost of δ > 0 that is payable by young agents.9 In an equilibrium, agents will hold either storage
or money but never both. This split captures, albeit in an extreme way, the notion that the rich in the
real world do not store much of their wealth in the form of money. It also generates an endogenous
distribution of money and interest-bearing asset holders.
When young, agents pay a lump-sum tax, T, to the government.10 Consider the problem of an
individual with income y who wishes to access the storage technology by paying the fixed cost. Then,
her budget constraints are given by
cs1 = y − S − T − δ cs2 = xS (2)
where S is her saving in the form of storage, and the superscript s indicates storage. Notice that since
money is dominated in rate of return by storage, individuals have no incentive to hold both money
and storage. Agents maximize (1) subject to (2) to get at their optimal investment in the storage
technology: S(y) = y−δ−T2 . This implies that an agent contemplating investing in storage would enjoy
first and second period consumption given by
cs1 =
y − δ − T
2
, cs2 = x
µ
y − δ − T
2
¶
(3)
Her indirect utility would be
Us (y) = ln
·
y − δ − T
2
¸
+ ln
·
x
µ
y − δ − T
2
¶¸
. (4)
Now, consider a person who wishes to hold only money. Such an agent’s budget constraints are
given by:
cm1 = y − T −m cm2 = Rm ·m (5)
9One may think of this as the fixed cost of accessing financial markets or the cost of adopting financial technologies
that Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Lucas (2000) discuss.
10As will be clear below, our main result relies heavily on the assumption of availability of lump-sum taxes. A natural
question that arises is, why are proportional income taxes not available? Since there are no labor-leisure or production
decisions to be made in the current model, confronting a progressive/proportional income tax in an electoral race with the
inflation tax would produce uninteresting voting outcomes, either a 100% or a 0% political support for seigniorage. As
pointed out in the introduction, virtually all real world economies rely an “interior” extent on inflation. Our restriction of
allowing only lump sum income taxes allows us to capture this “interiority” in the simplest possible model.
Finally, even though pure lump sum income taxes are rare in the real world, many tax instruments that are employed
share varying degrees of regressivity with the lump-sum tax. Our formulation of the lump-sum tax is therefore a simple
proxy for any and all such regressive taxes. Additionally, as a referee points out, the rich in many countries often find
ways to escape proportional taxation as well.
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where m is the amount of real money balances held between periods, and the superscript m stands for
money. Such an agent maximizes (1) subject to (5) to get at her optimal money holdings: m(y) = y−T2 .
This implies that her consumption in the first and second periods will be
cm1 =
1
2
[y − T ] , cm2 =
1
2
[Rm(y − T )] .
and her indirect utility will be
Um (y) = ln
·
y − T
2
¸
+ ln
·
Rm
µ
y − T
2
¶¸
. (6)
Obviously, agents with income y for whom Us (y) ≥ Um (y) will not hold any money. This condition
reduces to
ln
"
x
µ
y − δ − T
2
¶2#
≥ ln
"
Rm
µ
y − T
2
¶2#
⇔ (x−Rm) (y − T )2 − 2δx (y − T ) + xδ2 ≥ 0
It is easy to check that this inequality is satisfied for incomes that satisfy
y − T ≤ δ
·
x+
√
xRm
(x−Rm)
¸
(7)
We define
y† ≡ δ
·
x+
√
xRm
(x−Rm)
¸
. (8)
Only agents with incomes y > y†+T will access the storage technology. All others will hold only money.
We now turn to the determination of Rm.
2.1 Return on money
The only purpose of the government is to raise enough revenue from lump-sum taxes and from the
inflation tax (seigniorage) to finance its exogenously-specified spending of g per young person. We
assume that this spending is entirely “purposeless” in that government purchases do not aﬀect agents’
utility or their budget sets.11 Young agents vote on the fraction of this spending that should be financed
using lump-sum taxes (which we denote by φ). Whatever amount is not to be raised by lump-sum taxes
11The assumption of “purposeless” spending allows us to abstract away from considering the distributional eﬀects of
government spending.
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must be raised via seigniorage. The central bank controls the nominal money stock changing it to raise
the requisite revenue.12
At each date t ≥ 1, the government has a balanced budget. The government budget constraint is
represented as: T + SN = g, where SN stands for seigniorage. Formally, the government’s reliance on
tax revenues, denoted φ ∈ [0, 1], is captured by the following expression:
T = φg, SN ≡M(1−Rm) = (1− φ)g (9)
where M stands for the aggregate demand for real money balances. Higher values of φ represent the
will of the electorate to raise more of the revenue from taxes and less from seigniorage. So as to not
bankrupt anyone, we will assume that ymin > g. This assumption implies that φ = 1 is feasible.
Aggregate money demand is computed from
M =
Z y†
ymin
m(y)f(y)dy.
Then, it follows that
(1−Rm)
Z y†
ymin
m(y)f(y)dy = (1− φ)g ⇔
"Z y†
ymin
yf(y)dy − T
Z y†
ymin
f(y)dy
#
=
2(1− φ)g
(1−Rm)
.
Noting that T = φg, we can calculate the return to money as:
Rm = 1−
2(1− φ)gR y†
ymin yf(y)dy − φg
R y†
ymin f(y)dy
= 1− 2(1− φ)gR y†
ymin yf(y)dy − φgF (y
†)
(10)
where F is the cumulative distribution. The determinants of Rm are government purchases, the to-be
elected reliance on seigniorage, and the size of the inflation tax base. Note that the holders of the
inflation tax base are young agents whose incomes lie in the interval
£
ymin, y†
¤
. Since y† is a function
of φ, it follows that both the measure of agents holding money and the amount of money being held
by that measure are both endogenous variables. Furthermore, equations (10) and (8) jointly determine
y† and Rm which are both functions of φ. That is, given a φ, any agent can immediately use (10) and
(8) to jointly compute y† and Rm which in turn tells her if for that value of φ, she would be happier
holding storage or holding money.
12The central bank is not independent. It receives a mandate from the electorate on how much seigniorage revenue it
must raise. It prints new money to generate the mandated revenue.
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Equations (10) and (8) embody a direct connection between the elected value of φ and the real
return on money in the economy. Agents understand this connection and use it when ranking diﬀerent
values of φ. It is easily seen that the outcome of the election on φ indirectly determines a money growth
rate that is to be passively implemented by the central bank.13 It is in this precise sense that the
central bank is not independent.14 Higher values of φ represent greater reliance on taxes and less on
seigniorage.
The environment described above is fairly rich in the sense that the return to money as well as the
distribution of storage and money holders are jointly endogenous. With logarithmic utility, changes in
the aggregate demand for money comes from agents switching from holding only money to holding only
storage and vice versa.
2.2 Voting
The timeline (see Figure 1) is as follows. Each young agent (indexed by a unique income y) takes part
in the voting process.15 We think of agents as voting on φ before making their consumption-saving
decisions. As Dolmas, Huﬀman, and Wynne (2000) note, this is the most interesting case to look at.
It is important to note here that indirect utilities induced by the policy choice φ may not be single-
peaked. This happens because agents may be induced, for higher φ, to switch to the storage technology.
In what follows, we focus only on the Condorcet majority winner. Once the winning φ becomes known,
the central bank picks the money growth rate that implements that φ. This determines the return on
money that the current young will enjoy when they are old. In other words, the current old have no
reason to care about the election of φ going on during the period.16 This in turn implies that the
13Dolmas, Huﬀman, and Wynne (2000) allow agents to vote directly on Rm. Our formulation is isomorphic to theirs.
14Alesina and Summers (1993) define the notion of “economic independence” as follows: “Economic independence is
defined as the ability [of the central bank] to use instruments of monetary policy without restrictions. The most common
constraint imposed upon the conduct of monetary policy is the extent to which the central bank is required to finance
government deficits.” In other words, the central bank in our model is not economically independent.
15Azariadis and Galasso (1996) provide some evidence to suggest that the age of the median voter in many elections in
the United States has been below 45. In other words, they lend credence to the usual assumption that is made (just as we
indirectly do) that the median voter is young.
16Recall that elections are held before young agents make their consumption-saving decisions. We assume that the price
level for the period (pt) is known at the start of the period. After the election is declared, the φ becomes known, and so
does Rm (= pt/pt+1) . Following the election, the current old and the young (who now know how much money they want
in equilibrium) trade goods for money at the known price level (pt) . In eﬀect then, when the young elect a φ at date t, they
are picking the price level for the next period (pt+1). Since the current old will not be around next period, the “choice” of
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standard commitment problem of getting the future young to implement the election outcomes reached
by the current young does not arise here.17
Formally, a voting equilibrium is defined as stationary allocations {cs1, cs2, cm1 , cm2 } that maximize (1)
taking prices and the distribution of endowments as given, equations (8) and (10) that completely char-
acterize money market clearing and price determination, the government budget constraint is satisfied,
and the fraction of government reliance on lump-sum taxes (φ) is the Condorcet majority winner.
3 Computational Experiments
Since single-peakedness is absent, the median voter theorem may not be available to pick the Condorcet
winner. Following standard practice, we resort to numerical computations. We start by choosing a
functional form for the density function, f(y). We assume a lognormal distribution [ln y distributed as
N(µ, σ2)] with mean µ = 3.606 and standard deviation σ = 0.615. Bearse, Glomm, and Janeba (2000)
argue that such a choice does a good job of capturing the actual US household income distribution in
1992 if income is measured in thousands of dollars. In our experiments, we will change σ, and this in
turn will change the Gini coeﬃcient, leaving the median unchanged.18Draws of 50,001 incomes are taken
from this distribution. The unit interval for φ is converted into a grid of 301 points. We set x = 4.5,
pt+1 does not aﬀect them; hence, they do not care about the current election.
It is interesting to consider what would happen if the timing assumptions were altered (say pt, and hence, the return on
money, pt−1/pt between t− 1 and t was determined after the election at t) to make the current old care about and vote
in the current election. First, there would be two types of current old to contend with, those who held only storage when
young, and those who held only money when young (recall, this composition is endogenous in our model). The storage
holders would not care about the current election since the return on storage is unaﬀected by the election; also, under our
current assumptions, the old do not pay the lump sum tax. As a modeling issue, we would be forced to take a stand on
how these old storage holders would vote (i.e., would they choose high or low inflation). Were we to leave them out of the
electoral process, matters would get even more complicated because we would then have a situation where even the size
of the electorate was endogenous (and depended on the election itself!).
17Bullard and Waller (2001) produce a model similar in some respects to ours where the real action lies in the tension
between the young and the old over the desired inflation rate in the economy. In their model (theirs is a model with capital
and no intragenerational heterogeneity), elections to determine the value of the money growth rate takes place near the
end of a period. At that time, the soon-to-be old want low inflation (high real interest rates) so as to maximize the return
on their past predetermined saving, while the soon-to-be born young want high inflation (which via a Tobin-type eﬀect,
produces higher capital and hence, higher wages for them).
18The lognormal density [ln y distributed as N(µ, σ2)] is given by
e{−(ln y−µ)2/2σ2}
yσ
√
2π
, its mean by eµ+0.5σ
2
, its median
by eµ, skewness by eσ
2
+ 2
³√
eσ
2 + 1
´
, and the Gini by 2Φ(σ/
√
2) − 1, where Φ is the Cdf for the standard normal
distribution.
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δ = 55, and g = 8. The corresponding Gini is 0.336.
For this baseline set of parameters, the unique voting equilibrium has the following features.19 In
this equilibrium, only 4.85% of the electorate ends up accessing the storage technology.20 The winning
policy-combination is given by φ = 0.687 which implies that the electorate votes for 30.13% of the
government’s revenue to be raised via seigniorage. The implied elected inflation rate is 18.1%. The
equilibrium also has the feature that the seigniorage to real GDP (GDP in the example is measured
by adding up the real endowments y of all the young) ratio is about 5.63%, and the government
expenditures to GDP ratio is 18.0%. Ours is not an attempt at a full-blown calibration exercise; our
goal is simply to present a “plausible” numerical example to illustrate certain novel features of the
theoretical relationship between monetary policy and income inequality.
We are particularly interested in the relationship between the winning policy-combination and the
extent of income inequality. Figure 2 plots the elected φ against the Gini coeﬃcient. The figure is
striking in one particular aspect: the relationship is nonmonotonic; indeed, the plot is U-shaped. When
evaluated at low levels of inequality, an increase in income inequality is associated with an increase
in the reliance on inflation. There exists, however, a threshold value such that for values of the Gini
coeﬃcient above it, the elected reliance on inflation falls in response to any further increases in income
equality.
The intuition behind Figure 2 is as follows. Consider a starting point where σ is low (low inequality)
implying that a large mass of people are centered around the median. For expositional convenience,
assume also that at this point, no one can aﬀord storage and so everyone holds money. Voters tradeoﬀ
the regressivity of the lump sum tax against the distortionary eﬀects of the inflation tax. Figure 3 graphs
the indirect utility for individuals at each decile of the endowment distribution.21The poorest among
these voters hold little money and therefore like inflation while the richer ones prefer the lump-sum tax.
19As is well known, absent regularity conditions on the indirect utilities, Condorcet cycles may emerge [φa wins against
φb and φb wins against φc but φc wins against φa]. Following standard practice, we ignore these cycles in our numerical
analysis.
20It is easy to generate examples where a much higher percentage of the electorate uses the storage technology. In fact,
ceteris paribus, using a utility function U(c1, c2) = ln c1 + β ln c2 where β < 1, we have been able to generate examples
where the percent of people holding only storage is as high as 20%.
21Figure 3 uses g = 5, δ = 30, x = 4.5, and σ = 0.615 (corresponding to a Gini of 33.6). A electorate of a 1001 voters is
used.
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The elected φ is high because a large mass of voters centered around the median who hold relatively
large amounts of money dislike seigniorage. As σ increases (causing the Gini to rise), the mass of people
at the tails increase, but the median is unchanged. In popular language, the middle class gets “hollowed
out”; some get poorer and some get richer. The mass at the low tails increases and these voters start
to like inflation more. The mass at the upper tails also increases: the mass of storage holders increase
and they all prefer 100% reliance on inflation. The only mass of voters that likes inflation less is the
group who were near the center and got richer, but are not rich enough to aﬀord storage. Overall,
because the income distribution got more skewed, this last group has smaller mass than the combined
mass of voters who like inflation more than before. The winning φ is therefore lower. The elected φ
continues to fall as σ rises until a crucial threshold is reached; now the mass of storage holders is quite
high and the inflation tax base is small. To satisfy the government budget constraint (recall g is fixed),
money-holding voters would have to either further increase inflation or they start imposing a lump-sum
tax so as to be able to get the storage holders to pay some of the expenses. In other words, after a
certain threshold level of inequality is reached, because of the shrinking inflation tax base, voters start
to find the inflation tax even more regressive than the lump sum tax. ¿From then on, the winning φ
starts to rise.
We now turn to some welfare comparisons. In this analysis, our welfare comparisons are made against
a zero-inflation (constant money stock) benchmark. We construct a measure of aggregate welfare which
is a weighted sum of the steady-state lifetime utilities of all the electorate computed at the winning
policy-package combination. We then compare this number to the weighted sum of the utilities of all
the electorate computed at φ = 1 (the zero inflation rate). The “welfare cost of inflation” ratio is the
ratio of aggregate welfare under the winning φ to welfare under φ = 1. Figure 4 plots this “welfare cost
of inflation” ratio (as a percent) against levels of income inequality. The ratio is 100% when the elected
φ is 1 (when all the revenue is raised through direct taxes). Whenever this ratio exceeds 100%, it implies
that aggregate welfare is higher with some positive inflation when compared to zero inflation. As is
clear from the figure, there is a range of Ginis (36-54) in which society, as a whole, is “better oﬀ” with
some positive inflation rather than with zero inflation. 22 Finally, Figure 5 illustrates the diﬀerence
22Just to clarify further, we are not comparing the average steady state utility under the voting equilibrium with inflation
with the average steady state utility under the first best (no inflation and person-specific lump sum income tax). We are,
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between the φ which the median income voter would have preferred, and the Condorcet winning φ. Note
that when there is little income inequality, the median voter’s preferred φ and the Condorcet winner
are essentially identical.
4 Empirics
The model has produced a causal relationship between income inequality and an electorate’s preference
for inflationary finance. In particular, the relationship is predicted to be non-monotonic. Below, we test
this powerful implication using time-averaged cross-country data from the 56 countries listed in Table
2.23 To that end, we regress a measure of a country’s reliance on seigniorage on inequality and some
controls.
We allow the model to guide us in the creation of a measure of a country’s reliance on seigniorage.
This approach is diﬀerent from the literature (discussed in the introduction) that focuses on income
inequality and its connection with inflation. In the model, an electorate’s preference for inflationary
finance is 1−φ which we compute as follows: from the government budget constraint, total seigniorage
revenue collected must satisfy SN = (1− φ)g, and so,
seigniorage
GDP
G
GDP
= (1− φ).
Cross country data on seigniorage to GDP and government spending to GDP is easy to find. Seignior-
age to GDP ratio is measured as the average ratio of the change in the monetary base to GDP. The
government spending to GDP ratio is the average ratio of government to GDP for the sample period.
The data are taken from Click (1998), using the sample means computed using data for the period
1971-90.
The Gini data are time-averages (for the period 1950 to 1990 whenever available) computed from
Deininger and Squire’s (1996) high-quality inequality data set. The pre-tax income distribution was
used to construct these Ginis. As a control, we include a measure of financial development, PRIVO
however, comparing utility in an equilibrium with inflation with another with no inflation.
23Our exercise is in line with Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) who find cross-country empirical backing for
their central hypothesis: countries with more polarized systems rely more heavily on seigniorage as a source of revenue
than do more homogeneous societies.
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(credit extended to the private sector by commercial banks), taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Levine (2001). Our purpose was to capture any cross country diﬀerences in development of financial
markets.24 Other important control variables are the level of real GDP in 1960 (RGDP60) and level
of literacy in 1960 (LIT60) to capture diﬀerences in “initial” human and physical capital stocks. The
literacy variable was also inspired by Easterly and Fischer (2000) who found evidence in polling data
that the likelihood of citing inflation as a concern is inversely related to the educational attainment
of the respondents. In addition, we include political economy measures, such as a measure of mixed
government (MIX), a dummy variable for a socialist government (SOC), an index of political freedom,
and an index of civil liberties (CIVIL) (to measure the importance and overall power of democratic
institutions). We also included the time-averaged fraction of people at or above the age of 65 before 1970
(OLD65) to capture the diﬀerences in initial demographics and the resultant bias toward redistribution.
These control or conditioning variables serve to capture inherent diﬀerences between the countries that
are not included in our model.25
Across the countries in the data set, seigniorage accounts for an average of 10% of government
expenditures. Note that since seigniorage-reliance is defined as 1−φ, the relationship between the tax-
reliance variable and the Gini coeﬃcient will be opposite in sign to the relationship between seigniorage-
reliance and the Gini. The simple correlation coeﬃcient between φ and the Gini coeﬃcient is -0.27. In
other words, there is a positive, albeit small, correlation between the level of income inequality and the
reliance on seigniorage revenue across countries. This correlation coeﬃcient is quantitatively in line with
what others have reported in the inflation-inequality literature (see, for example, Dolmas, Huﬀman, and
Wynne, 2000, and Albanesi, 2000).
Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the relationship between φ and income inequality along with
the control variables mentioned above. The usual standard errors are reported in parenthesis.26 In an
attempt to capture any non-linearity in the relationship as suggested by our results in Section 3, we
included both the Gini, and the square of the Gini. Thus, we are approximating the functional form by
24We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
25The data are from readily available World Bank sources. See http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/paauthor.htm
26We also calculated White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. These are similar in magnitude to the OLS
standard errors; therefore, they are not reported here.
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a second degree polynomial, an acceptable procedure if the functional form is reasonably smooth. We
also considered adding in the cube of Gini, but it did not add any explanatory power to the regression.27
Table 1 reports a negative coeﬃcient on the Gini and a positive coeﬃcient on the square of the Gini.
These coeﬃcients are always significant at the 5% level; moreover, the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients
are the same across all sets of control variables that we have employed. The only control variable which
is ever significant is PRIVO. Adjusted R2 varies between 0.19 and 0.23 in the regressions, which is
substantially higher than the values typically reported in the inflation-inequality literature. The non-
linearity in Gini accounts for about 30% of the explanatory ability of the model, yet another indication
that the non-linear component of the econometric model is essential.28
As additional, unreported, robustness checks, we carried out weighted least squares. We weigh each
observation with 1/CBI, where CBI is a measure of central bank independence taken from Cukierman,
Webb, and Neyapti (1992). The idea behind the weighting is that countries with very independent
central banks would likely behave very diﬀerently from the model’s predictions, as these central banks
would be subject to little political pressure. This procedure did not change the results. We also
checked for high leverage and influential observations by calculating the leverage and the influence of
the individual countries.29 Countries with high leverage were Zimbabwe, Switzerland and South Africa,
while influential observations were Argentina, Switzerland and Japan. Re-estimating the model without
these countries did not in any way aﬀect the results, and we therefore continue to include them in our
dataset.30
The fitted econometric model implies that the relationship between φ and the Gini index of income
inequality is given by
φ = 1.48− 0.028 ·Gini + 0.0003 ·Gini2 + 0.001 · PRIVO+ error. (11)
27In fact, in a regression of Gini3 on a constant, Gini and Gini2, the R2 turns out to be 0.99. This implies that the data
on Gini3 does not contain any information that is not already included in the second degree polynomial. Adding Gini3
would therefore cause severe multicollinearity.
28For example, if regression I in Table 1 is carried out without Gini2, adjusted R2 drops to around 0.15. It is interesting
to note that Dolmas, Huﬀman, and Wynne (2000) and Albanesi (2000) do not include a squared-gini term in their inflation
vs. inequality regressions.
29For a formal description of such tests, see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) pg. 32-39.
30Albanesi (2000) eliminates Morocco, Tunisia, Malaysia and Honduras for “being low inflation but very high inequality”
countries. Our outlier and “influential observations” tests did not pick these countries.
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The relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.31 To get a rough sense of the magnitudes implied by (11),
consider the fact that the US Gini increased from 34.4 in 1975 to 37.26 in 1985. A change in income
inequality of this magnitude alone would have been associated with an additional 1.9% of government
spending (roughly 0.4% of US GDP) being financed via seigniorage.
¿From (11), it follows that:
∂φ
∂Gini
= −0.028 + 0.0006 ·Gini
This implies that when the Gini is less than 46.7 (the post-war average Gini for the US is around 36),
the derivative is negative, but for higher values of Gini it becomes positive. In other words, the data
suggests that the relationship between φ and the Gini index of income inequality is non-monotone.
In particular, beyond a Gini of 46.7, the reliance on seigniorage falls with further increases in income
inequality. In the data, there are 9 countries with Gini higher than this threshold who also rely relatively
little on seigniorage.32 This evidence is consistent with the findings reported in Section 3, especially
Figure 2.
It is important to note that the predicted positive relationship between φ and Gini for Gini greater
than 46.7 is not necessarily at odds with the standard results in the literature on inflation-inequality.
While there is a theoretical one-to-one correspondence between φ and seigniorage in this specific model,
and there is a generally accepted link between seigniorage and inflation, the correlation in our data
between (1− φ) and inflation is 0.6, and the correlation in the data between inflation and our measure
of seigniorage [see Click, 1998] is only 0.4. As such, our results do not contradict those of the inflation-
inequality literature.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper attempts to answer the question: if central banks face stiﬀ political pressure from the elec-
torate, what kind of monetary policies are they likely to implement? We employ a standard overlapping
generations model with heterogenous young-age endowments, and a government that funds an exoge-
31The results from Regression I are used. The coeﬃcient on PRIVO was multiplied by the mean of PRIVO.
32These countries are Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Jamaica, Malaysia, Honduras, Phillipines, Kenya, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe.
17
nous spending via a combination of lump-sum income taxes and the inflation tax. Agents can hold
money or a costly fixed real return asset. Numerical experiments reveal that the relationship between
the long-run elected reliance on the inflation tax and income inequality is non-monotonic; in particular,
the reliance on seigniorage may actually decrease as income inequality rises beyond a threshold. This
is a powerful new result derived from a barebones model. We demonstrate robust empirical backing
for this hypothesis from a cross-section of countries. Extending our analysis to incorporate, more gen-
eral preferences (thereby allowing for two-sided seigniorage Laﬀer curves and interest-sensitive money
demand), richer assets like capital, a non-trivial labor-leisure choice, progressive taxation, and even
intergenerational conflict, etc., would constitute fruitful directions for future research.
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Figure 2: Elected φ as a function of Gini
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Figure 3: Indirect utility20
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Figure 4: Equilibrium welfare cost of inflation as a function of Gini.
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Figure 5: The Condorcet winner vs. the median income voter’s choice of φ.
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Table 1
(standard errors in parentheses)
Variable I II III IV V VI
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.20
constant 1.48∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.267) (0.254) (0.261) (0.260) (0.287)
Gini -0.028∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.029∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Gini2 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
PRIVO 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.0007 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
RGDP60 - 0.0002 - - - -
- (0.011) - - - -
LIT60 - -0.037 - - - -
- (0.068) - - - -
CIVIL - - -0.013 - - -
- - (0.010) - - -
Political Freedom - - - 0.002 - -
- - - (0.011) - -
MIX - - - - -0.022 -
- - - - (0.025) -
SOC - - - - 0.009 -
- - - - (0.097) -
OLD65 - - - - - -0.103
- - - - - (0.530)
33Legend: ∗∗∗ indicates significant at the 1% level, ∗∗ indicates significant at the 5% level, ∗ indicates significant at
the 10% level.
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Table 2 (List of Countries Used)
Argentina El Salvador Korea, Republic of Sierra Leone
Australia Finland Malaysia South Africa
Austria France Mauritius Spain
Barbados Germany Mexico Sri Lanka
Belgium Ghana Nepal Sweden
Bolivia Greece Netherlands Switzerland
Brazil Honduras New Zealand Thailand
Canada India Niger Togo
Chile Ireland Norway Trinidad and Tobago
Colombia Israel Pakistan United Kingdom
Costa Rica Italy Paraguay United States
Denmark Jamaica Peru Uruguay
Dominican Republic Japan Philippines Venezuela
Ecuador Kenya Portugal Zimbabwe
24
References
[1] Albanesi, S. “Inflation and inequality”, Universita’ Bocconi, IGIER working paper #199 (2000);
revised version, 2003
[2] Alesina, Alberto and Lawrence H. Summers, “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25 (May),
151-63 (1993)
[3] Azariadis, C, and V. Galasso “Discretion, rules, and volatility”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review, May/June (1996)
[4] Bearse, P., G. Glomm, and E. Janeba “Why poor countries rely mostly on redistribution in-kind”,
Journal of Public Economics, 75: 463-481, (2000)
[5] Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza, “Finance and the Sources of Growth,” Journal
of Financial Economics 58 (October): 261-300. (2000)
[6] Bhattacharya, J., and J. H. Haslag “On the use of the inflation tax when non-distortionary taxes
are available”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 4, 823-841, (2001)
[7] Bryant J. and N.Wallace, “A price discrimination analysis of monetary policy”, Review of Economic
Studies, 279-88.(1984)
[8] Bullard, J., and C.J. Waller “Central bank design in general equilibrium”, mimeo Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis (2001); forthcoming Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
[9] Click, R.W. “Seignorage in a cross-section of countries”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
30 (2), 154-170 (1998)
[10] Cukierman, A., S. Edwards, and G. Tabellini “Seigniorage and political instability”, American
Economic Review, 537-555 (1992)
[11] Cukierman, A., S. Webb and B. Neyapti “Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its
Eﬀect on Policy Outcomes”, World Bank Economic Review, 6, 353-398, (1992).
[12] Davidson, Russell; MacKinnon, James G. Estimation and inference in econometrics Oxford; New
York; Toronto and Melbourne: Oxford University Press, (1993)
[13] Deininger, K and L. Squire. “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality”,World Bank Economic
Review 10 (3), 565-591. (1996)
[14] Dolmas, J, G. W. Huﬀman, and M.A. Wynne “Inequality, inflation, and central bank indepedence”,
Canadian Journal of Economics, 33 (1), 271-287 (2000)
[15] Easterly, W., and S. Fischer “Inflation and the poor”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 33
(2), 160-178 (2001)
25
[16] Erosa, A., and G. J. Ventura “On inflation as a regressive consumption tax”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 49 (4), 761-795 (2002)
[17] Kennickell A.B., M. Starr-McCluer, and Brian Surette “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:
Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances”, Federal Reserve Bulletin, January (2000)
[18] Keister, L Wealth in America, Cambridge University Press (2000)
[19] Loewy, M. B “Equilibrium Policy in an Overlapping Generations Economy”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 22(3), 485-99 (1988)
[20] Lucas Robert E. “Inflation and Welfare,” Econometrica 68, 247-274. (2000)
[21] Mulligan, C.B., and X. Sala-i-Martin “Extensive margins and the demand for money at low interest
rates”, Journal of Political Economy, 108 (5), 961-991 (2000)
26
